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The revelations in The 
Pentagon Papers distressed 
many American citizens. Yet 
their impact on public morale 
far outreached their impact 
on national policy. Too many 
citizens had convinced them-
selves that Americans in high 
places would not lie to their 
constitutents. Despite the evi-
dence, many Americans con-
tinue to believe that the 
foreign policy of the United 
States is propelled only by an 
honorable quest for interna-
tional law and is rooted in 
democratic agreements pub-
licly made. For other Ameri-
cans, however, The Pentagon 
Papers indicated that democ-
racy is now, and has always 
been, endangered by war. 
They have concluded that 
since success in war seems to require secrecy and duplicity, one of the 
major functions of the peace movement may be to provide the public 
with the truth. 
When the War was over, I saw that all I 
had done had been totally useless except to 
myself. I had not saved a single life or 
shortened the War by a minute. I had not 
succeeded in doing anything to diminish the 
bitterness which caused the Treaty of Ver-
sailles. But at any rate I had not been an 
accomplice in the crime of all the belligerent 
nations, and for myself I had acquired a 
new philosophy and a new youth. . . . 
Bertrand Russell, The Auto-
biography of Bertrand Russell, 
Vol. I I (Boston, 1968), 38-39. 
I believe that the people in the long run 
are going to do more to promote peace than 
any governments. Indeed, I think that peo-
ple want peace so much that one of these 
days governments had better get out of their 
way and let them have it. 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
to Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan, London, 1959. 
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During World War I both Britain and the United States, two of the 
oldest and most self-congratulatory democracies, experienced periods of 
repression which left permanent scars on their proud heritage. But in 
both nations organizations emerged which sought to preserve political 
liberty. A survey of the goals and experiences of the American Union 
Against Militarism and England's Union of Democratic Control reveals 
not only the fragile nature of democracy in wartime, but suggests also 
that private citizens must prepare to fight against those forces which 
threaten their nation's democratic institutions.1 
There were many parallels between the American Union Against 
Militarism and England's Union of Democratic Control. Not only were 
they similar in the vision and political attitudes of their membership, 
the structure of their organization and the means which they adopted 
to register their dissent, but also in the experiences which their members 
endured in wartime. These experiences served to measure the truth of 
that conviction which had brought the antimilitarists together in the 
first place—the belief that the real enemy was not Germany but war it-
self. They opposed war because war endangered liberty and all the 
political institutions which they cherished. As Jane Addams wrote, this 
was not a war between the forces of democracy and the forces of mili-
tarism. "War itself destroys democracy wherever it thrives . . . not only 
in Russia and Germany, but in the more democratic countries as well."2 
Bertrand Russell agreed with Addams' view. He wrote that what George 
Santayana had called "the Prussian educational-industrial-military domi-
nation" was just what the antimiltarists feared would conquer the de-
mocracies—not only by foreign imposition but internally.3 
Both the AUAM and UDC emerged during the early months of 
World War I and were led by people who were convinced that the war 
would end all their work for progressive reform and social justice. Gen-
erally, the antimilitarists were not active in the established peace move-
ment which flourished at the beginning of the twentieth century. They 
opposed World War I because they considered it the result of secret 
diplomacy forced on unknowing and unwilling citizens whose economic 
and social lives would be damaged by the war. The antimilitarists in 
both England and the United States were influenced by the same books 
and shared a common vision of democracy in which poverty would be 
abolished and individual freedom would thrive. Both English and 
American reformers were influenced by Charles Booth's monumental 
Life and Labour of the People in London and Seebolm Rowntree's first 
study of poverty in York, and members of both groups participated in 
the Settlement House Movement which was largely inspired by these 
studies. F. W. Pethick-Lawrence and Clifford Allen, the founder of the 
No-Conscription Fellowship, were identified with England's University 
Settlement and Toynbee Hall, whereas Jane Addams and Lillian Wald 
founded, respectively, Hull House and the Henry Street Settlement. 
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In Britain, 1906 was the year of the great Liberal election which 
meant to English reformers "a revolutionary swing in the direction of 
radicalism and social reform."4 Many of Parliament's forty liberals were 
closely identified with the UDC, notably Joseph King, Richard Lambert, 
Arthur Ponsonby and Charles Trevelyan; J. Ramsay MacDonald was 
the leader of the Independent Labour Party. The other members were 
associated with all manner of reform activities. E. D. Morel, the UDC's 
secretary and most active member, was famous for his exposure of Belgian 
misrule in the Congo and he founded the Congo Reform Association; 
Helena M. Swanwick was a journalist and prominent suffragist; Charles 
R. Buxton, a Member of Parliament, was a leading proponent of labor 
reform; J. A. Hobson wrote on numerous subjects, including unemploy-
ment and the maldistribution and underconsumption of wealth; and 
Norman Angell through his writings inspired Angell Leagues for Inter-
national Polity throughout Europe and America. 
In the United States the AU AM was led by prominent reformers who 
worked closely with Jane Addams and Lillian Wald: Crystal Eastman, 
an attorney and pioneer in labor relations and fair housing legislation; 
her brother, Max Eastman, the editor of an exuberant magazine of 
protest, The Masses; Oswald Garrison Villard, who owned and edited 
The Nation; and Paul Kellogg, the editor of Survey, an important jour-
nal which focused on social problems and was directed to social workers. 
In their statement of principles, entitled "Towards a Peace That 
Shall Last," issued in 1915, the members of the AUAM declared that their 
right to protest war was established by the unemployment of the water-
fronts, the augmented misery of the cities, and by the financial depres-
sion "which has curtailed our school building and crippled our works of 
good will. War has brought low our conception of the preciousness of 
human life, as slavery brought low our conception of human dignity." 
Like Clifford Allen who wondered while in prison why England, "so 
famous for its love of liberty, should have never yet achieved that real 
liberty of the individual that can only come with the abolition of 
poverty,"5 the antimilitarists on both sides of the Atlantic resented the 
war because it threatened to destroy their life's work. Even the Fabians 
who refused to join any dissident movement against the war believed 
that it would destroy England's rebels, feminists and Guild Socialists. 
Beatrice Webb, for example, feared that England might "slip into a 
subtle form of reaction—lose faith in democracy and gain enjoyment from 
the mere display of Power."6 
The leaders of the UDC made a specific appeal to the rank and file 
of British labour because, as E. D. Morel noted, "British labour in the 
mass had never appreciated the fact that the conduct and character of its 
foreign relations was intimately bound up with its own internal emanci-
pation." Morel believed that "the entire burden" of the British Em-
pire ultimately rested "upon the shoulders of British labour."7 
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But Morel did not want the UDC specifically identified with Labour 
Party politics. He rejected the idea popular among some of his as-
sociates that the antimilitarists should use the occasion of the war to 
build momentum for a socialist revolution. Morel believed that the 
unjust and dangerous use of capitalism "had to be attacked from a 
thousand sides." However, no progress would be made so long as war 
could arise to "set back at any moment" the advances made by labour. 
Morel wanted every "people in every land . . . free to pursue their march 
towards emancipation/' He was convinced that nothing permanent 
would be achieved as long as war remained a perpetually threatening 
force.8 
In the UDC's first publication, "The Morrow of the War," Morel 
wrote that the "idea of a federalised Europe . . . involving the disappear-
ance or substantial reduction, of standing armies and navies" was the 
ultimate goal. But it could not be attained until the democracies of the 
west realized the impossibility of having "a system of government which 
leaves them at the mercy of the intrigues and imbecilities of professional 
diplomatists and of the ambitions of military castes; helpless, too, in the 
face of an enormously powerful and internationalized private interest 
dependent for its profits upon the maintenance of that 'armed peace' 
which is the inevitable prelude to the carnage and futility of war . . . ."9 
According to Morel, all social progress depended on the establishment 
of democratic control of foreign policy. 
The English antimilitarists eschewed all questions of domestic politics 
during wartime and worked solely for the settlement of disputes by in-
ternational arbitration and a progressive and lasting peace. In the first 
open letter sent by the organizers of the UDC to potential members, 
Ramsay MacDonald, Charles Trevelyan, Norman Angell and E. D. 
Morel outlined the goals of the UDC: to secure real parliamentary con-
trol over foreign policy and to prevent secret diplomacy from ever again 
being "forced upon the country as an accomplished fact"; to establish 
direct negotations with democratic parties and influences in Europe, "so 
as to form an International understanding depending on popular 
parties rather than on governments"; and to secure a peace treaty 
which will not, "either through the humiliation of the defeated nation 
or an artificial re-arrangement of frontiers," become the starting point 
for future wars.10 
Like the members of the AUAM, the members of the UDC were 
neither absolute pacifists nor revolutionaries. Indeed, both groups 
worked well within the established political structure and went out of 
their way not to embarrass the Administrations whose military policies 
they abhorred. Due to hostile press reaction which followed the publi-
cation of their first open letters, the UDC issued a statement explaining 
that it was not "a stop the war movement."11 Charles Trevelyan, for 
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example, sought a reduction of armaments but, like the other members 
of the UDC, he was very careful to apply his demands to "all the bel-
ligerent powers" so as not to seem to be requesting the disarmament of 
Britain alone.12 Trevelyan believed that it was his duty as a citizen 
and as an MP to vote for supplies and to avoid "hampering the conduct 
of the war." But he believed patriotism did not require him "to be silent 
about the blunders of the Government past, present, or future."13 The 
UDC did not urge resistance to the war and did not "propose to take 
active steps." It was created to build an enlightened public opinion 
"which would take action in the Press and on the platform when the time 
comes . . . ."14 
The UDC was primarily concerned with keeping liberal war aims 
before the public. At no time did the members of the UDC become in-
volved in an active campaign to insure the freedoms of speech, assembly 
and press. But the very nature of their activities dragged them into that 
controversy. They asserted that the war "might have been prevented if 
the people had been aware of what the government was committing it 
to."15 In order to counter official censorship and to make the people 
aware of alternatives to Britain's official policy which they believed 
existed, the UDC distributed pamphlets containing the early speeches 
of President Wilson, statements by German socialists and pacifists and, 
in 1916, published secret agreements made between Britain, France and 
Italy, along with the denials of those agreements made by Herbert 
Asquith and Sir Edward Grey during 1913 and 1914.16 
The first phase of the AUAM's wartime program was almost a 
replica of the UDC's program. For the first three years of the European 
War the AUAM campaigned against preparedness and conscription and 
worked to maintain the neutrality of the United States. When war was 
declared the leaders of the AUAM announced that once the United 
States was in the war they would cease all opposition to it. But they still 
believed that America would have been in a stronger position as a 
neutral to bring the nations into a lasting federation for peace and that 
war would make "all the evils of militarism more active and virulent" 
and indefinitely delay "their ultimate goal of world federation and dis-
armament." Therefore, they demanded a clear statement of America's 
peace terms, the publication of all international agreements, and they 
promised "vigorous opposition" to compulsory military service.17 
Several members of the AUAM wanted to move faster than did Paul 
Kellogg and Lillian Wald, who were particularly reluctant to oppose 
Wilson or embarrass the Administration. In order to maintain the sup-
port of these two prominent leaders, Crystal Eastman suggested that a 
statement be issued to the press clarifying the Union's position and mak-
ing it clear that their's was not "a party of opposition" nor a "policy of 
obstruction." It was a "democracy first" movement. The declaration, 
when issued, also explained that the AUAM had believed that there were 
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alternatives to war, but since "the war. was a fact" it wanted "America 
to win." By victory the antimilitarists meant the achievement of those 
conditions for a negotiated peace which Wilson had called for, condi-
tions outlined also by the UDC and by the "revolutionary government 
of Russia," namely, no forcible annexations, no punitive indemnities, 
and free development of all nationalities.18 
After reading Wilson's June 14, 1917, Flag Day speech, however, most 
of the antimilitarists became more impatient and less concerned about 
embarrassing the Administration. Amos Pinchot wrote Crystal Eastman 
that Wilson had flourished "the knout over the objectors and all who 
would oppose the temporary little fatherhood which he is assuming in 
order to discourage autocracies in other climes."19 In his address, Wilson 
had identified the entire peace movement with treason and called the 
peace people schemers who sought to insure a German victory and im-
plant German civilization throughout Europe. The President referred 
to the peace movement as "the new intrigue, the intrigue for peace," and 
announced that the antimilitarists were "tools" of "the masters of 
Germany": 
The sinister intrigue is being no less actively conducted in 
this country than in Russia and in every country in Europe 
to which the agents and dupes of the Imperial German 
Government can get access. That Government has many 
spokesmen here, in places high and low. They have learned 
discretion. They keep within the law. It is opinion they 
utter now, not sedition. They proclaim the liberal purposes 
of their masters; declare this a foreign war which can touch 
America with no danger . . . ; set England at the center of 
the stage and talk of her ambition to assert economic domin-
ion throughout the world; appeal to our ancient tradition 
of isolation . . . ; and seek to undermine the Government 
with false professions of loyalty to its principles. 
But they will make no headway. The false betray themselves 
always in every accent. . . . This is a People's War, a war for 
freedom and justice and self-government amongst all the 
nations of the world, a war to make the world safe for the 
people who live upon it and make it their own. . . . For us 
there is but one choice. . . . Woe be to the man or group of 
men that seeks to stand in our way in this high clay of resolu-
tion when every principle we hold dearest is to be vindi-
cated and made secure for the salvation of the nations. . . .20 
This speech had a radicalizing effect on the antimilitarists. It 
served to put the repressive wartime measures sponsored by the Ad-
ministration in perspective. As a result, the members of the Union pur-
sued far more vigorously its programs devoted to the maintenance of 
constitutional freedoms and the rights of conscientious objectors. 
From April the antimilitarists campaigned against what became, on 
June 15, 1917, the Espionage Act. They petitioned Wilson not to 
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"sacrifice" the constitutional rights basic to the continuance of American 
democracy and objected to the comprehensive nature of the bill which 
included a mail censorship clause so vague that it jeopardized the free-
dom of every newspaper and magazine in the country. Any literature 
which caused "insubordination, disloyalty or mutiny" in the military, 
or which discouraged draft or enlistment services, or which might "em-
barrass or hamper the Government in conducting the war," was liable to 
confiscation. In their appeal the antimilitarists catalogued the meetings 
which already had been broken up, the instances of speakers arrested 
and of censorship imposed by mob violence. They urged Wilson to 
consider the future of America's "cherished institutions" if the "psy-
chology of war" were permitted to "manifest itself." Lillian Wald asked 
if it were not "possible that the moral danger to our democracy" might 
become more "serious than the physical. . . losses incurred."21 
Even before the Espionage Act passed, mail was censored and several 
Americans were arrested for "public criticism of the President" on the 
basis of a statute passed February 14, 1917, entitled "Threats Against 
the President Act," which covered any written or spoken word which 
threatened to do bodily harm or endanger the life of the president.22 
As a Canadian member of the Woman's Peace Party wrote to the 
American section: "Well you Americans are not going to let the Ger-
mans, Turks or Russian autocrats get ahead of you when you go in for 
liberty and democracy."23 
The effectiveness of the Espionage Act was assured through the estab-
lishment, by executive order, of the Committee on Public Information 
(CPI). Originally the CPI was to be the administration's news agency 
and was to control the press and public opinion. George Creel was 
chairman and the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy were members. 
The committee consisted of a domestic section, a foreign section and 
numerous divisions, including news, films, state fairs, industrial rela-
tions, civic and educational groups and a publicity establishment. Creel 
had been associated with the social reform movement as a crusading 
journalist. Indeed, as Arno Mayer pointed out, Creel's entire committee 
was composed of former crusaders: Arthur Bullard, Will Irwin, Ernest 
Poole, Louis F. Post, Ray Stannard Baker and Ida Tarbell, a veritable 
"roll call of the muckrackers."24 
Creel himself noted that Wilson opposed free speech during the war 
and informed the an timili tarists that the President had said " 'there 
could be no such thing—that it was insanity.' " To allow public opposi-
tion to the war would be to permit dissenters to " 'stab our soldiers in 
the back.' "25 
Shortly after the war was declared it became impossible for the anti-
militarists to get an honest hearing in any newspaper anywhere in the 
country. Jane Addams wrote that after America "entered the war, the 
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press throughout the country systematically undertook to misrepresent 
and malign pacifists as . . . a patriotic duty."26 Most of the small maga-
zines which reserved space for the views of the antimilitarists were either 
suppressed or denied access to the mails. Among the censored journals 
directly associated with the AUAM were The Masses, edited by Max 
Eastman, and Four Lights, the organ of the Woman's Peace Party of New 
York which was chaired by Crystal Eastman. Other suspended maga-
zines included The Appeal to Reason; the Michigan Socialist; the 
Milwaukee Leader; the New York Call; The Nation (for criticizing 
Samuel Gompers); and The Freeman's Journal for reprinting Thomas 
Jefferson's statements which favored Irish independence; the Irish World, 
for writing that Palestine would not become a Jewish state; The World 
Tomorrow, 2L religious pacifist magazine edited by Norman Thomas; and 
a Civil Liberties Bureau pamphlet which deplored mob violence.27 
The AUAM's protests against censorship and undemocratic practices 
were dismissed with little of the Administration's former solicitude. 
Amos Pinchot, for example, wrote Wilson for "an expression of opinion" 
regarding the numerous magazines and small papers which had been 
denied access to the mail. Pinchot asked Wilson if he did not think "free 
criticism" was of the "utmost importance in a democracy? . . . Can it be 
necessary, even in wartime, for the majority of a republic to throttle the 
voice of a sincere minority?" Pinchot concluded, "As friends of yours, 
and knowing how dear to you is the Anglo-Saxon tradition of intellectual 
freedom, we would like to feel that you do not sanction" censorship at 
the "bureaucratic discretion" of post office officials.28 Wilson replied 
that he hesitated to make a public statement which "would undoubtedly 
be taken advantage of by those with whom neither you nor I have been 
in sympathy at all."29 
Pinchot then went to Washington in order to request that Postmaster 
General Albert Burleson tell him on what basis the department suspended 
periodicals so that the editors might avoid suppression in the future. 
Burleson replied that he would not consider the question since "a remedy 
for the situation was amply provided for by the courts." Pinchot met 
with Burleson for two hours and left wondering how Wilson could "keep 
that elderly, village-idiot in his cabinet?" Still believing that Wilson was 
sympathetic to the aims of the antimilitarists, Pinchot reported his inter-
view with Burleson to Wilson and also the rumor that Lord Northcliffe, 
the British War Cabinet's expert in psychological warfare, had commis-
sioned Somerset Maugham to go to Russia to "buy up Russian news-
papers" and that Northcliffe himself had organized a "vigorous campaign 
to persuade American newspapers to support Britain's war aims."30 But 
Wilson was not sympathetic to the aims of the AUAM, and he wrote 
to Max Eastman that "a time of war must be regarded as wholly ex-
ceptional and that it is legitimate to regard things which would in 
ordinary circumstances be innocent as very dangerous to the public 
welfare." 
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In September, 1917, the AU AM itself was investigated by the Post 
Office Department which had decided to exclude two of the Union's 
pamphlets. Lillian Wald believed that both were entirely innocent and 
protested that all the Union's printed material had been "submitted in 
advance" to New York's postmaster. One of the pamphlets, written by 
Roger Baldwin, included a request to conscientious objectors to send 
letters which stated their position to the Secretary of War; the other 
was a reprint from the Survey of Norman Thomas' article, "War's 
Heretics/'31 
After the Department withheld the pamphlets for several weeks but 
refused to make a decision on their legality, Baldwin went personally to 
William Lamar and demanded a decision. Lamar asserted that " 'he 
naturally gave first attention to people whose loyalty to the government 
was unquestionable' " and he did not think Baldwin's organization 
worthy "of any particular consideration."32 After four months the anti-
militarists did go to court and the Justice Department ruled the pam-
phlets legal. 
In October, Burleson announced his general criteria for censorship. 
Publications would be suspended if they implied: " 'that this Govern-
ment got in the war wrong, that it is in it for wrong purposes, or any-
thing that will impugn the motives of the Government for going into 
the war. They cannot say that this Government is the tool of Wall 
Street or the munitions makers. That kind of thing makes for insubordi-
nation in the Army and Navy and breeds a spirit of disloyalty through-
out the country. . . .' " In addition, there could be "no campaign against 
conscription and the Draft Law. . . ."33 
Oswald Garrison Villard believed that Wilson was unaware of what 
the Post Office Department was doing. When The Nation was suspended 
Villard wrote Colonel House that the President "surely cannot know what 
is going on."34 Other antimilitarists were not so charitable in their 
estimation of Wilson's wartime behavior. James Warbasse, for example, 
considered Wilson's announcement that the Allies "must not be criti-
cized," the "last blow" to democracy and wrote that "if we are not to be 
permitted to make the world safe for democracy we at least must con-
tinue . . . to make the world unsafe for hypocrisy."35 Victor Berger, whose 
socialist Milwaukee Leader had been barred from the mails, believed 
that Wilson was "afraid of a revolution after the war" and was trying 
"to prevent it by putting the [radical] press out of business." Berger 
did not blame Wilson's advisers. He wrote to Pinchot that his criticism 
of Burleson was unfair. Burleson was "simply Woodrow Wilson's special 
delivery boy. Men of Burleson's type have no chance to become full 
grown men in Texas, where they . . . hold office while still very green 
and immature. They may get rotten . . . but they never ripen."36 
The AUAM also protested the violence which accompanied the Ad-
ministration's appeals to patriotic Americans to fight what Wilson had 
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called the "sinister intrigue" of German dupes, and the misguided but 
also dangerous dissenters.37 Some manifestations of that violence were 
limited to words, such as former Ambassador James Gerard's declaration 
that "we should hog-tie every disloyal German American, feed every 
pacifist raw meat, and hang every traitor to a lamp-post to insure success 
in this war."38 Other forms of violence were physical. The antimilitarists 
were convinced that America witnessed the first victories of Prussian 
militarism when in Boston "thousands of peaceful citizens" who had a 
permit to assemble, "were attacked by lawless soldiers and sailors in 
uniform" as the police stood by "apparently overawed by the uniform 
and did nothing except to arrest the victims." The AUAM noted that 
this scene had already occurred in "a dozen American cities" only three 
months after America's entrance into the war.39 
The greatest wartime outrage occurred in East St. Louis where scores 
of black people were beaten, lynched, burned and drowned, and the 
antimilitarists wondered at President Wilson's silence: 
Six weeks have passed since the East St. Louis riots and no 
public word of rebuke, no demand for the punishment of 
the offenders, has come from our Chief Executive. These 
American Negroes have died under more horrible conditions 
than any noncombatants who were sunk by German sub-
marines. But to our President their death does not merit 
consideration. 
Our young men who don their khaki are thus taught that, 
as they go out to battle under the flag of the United States, 
they may outdo Belgian atrocities without rebuke if their 
enemy be of a darker race. And those who guard our land 
at home have learned that black men and women and little 
children may safely be mutilated and shot and burned while 
they stand idly by.40 
It is little wonder that an English member of the Woman's Peace 
Party wrote: "In traveling about your country . . . it does not seem to 
me that you have a surplus of democracy here—certainly not enough to 
warrant exporting any of it."41 The antimilitarists recognized that 
possibility. Crystal Eastman wrote that if America destroyed its constitu-
tional freedoms "in the first fine frenzy of war enthusiasm, we shall not 
have much democracy left to take to the rest of the world." That was 
why the Civil Liberties Bureau was created—"to maintain something 
over here that will be worth coming back to when the weary war is 
over."42 
The Civil Liberties Bureau was established by the AUAM after a pro-
longed and divisive controversy which split the Union into two groups. 
Paul Kellogg, for example, decided after the United States entered the 
war that his primary concern was no longer "the struggle to hold the 
fort for democracy against militarism at home," but rather to organize 
the world for democracy. He feared that if the Union supported con-
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scientious objectors, the public would assume the AUAM was working 
for the military paralysis of America and it would lose its "influence and 
Power" in the post-war "drive for peace" toward a league of nations. 
The majority of the AUAM did not consider this a real conflict and 
decided to create the CLB anyway. Crystal Eastman stated that "the two 
go hand in hand. War is intolerable; we must get rid of war/' Militarism, 
"which is the fruit of war," tends to destroy democracy. Therefore, East-
man asked, how could anyone work for world peace and world democracy 
without first guarding democracy against militarism at home?43 
The Civil Liberties Bureau was established with offices throughout 
America to provide legal counsel to keep critics of the administration 
out of jail and to provide advice to conscientious objectors. It was headed 
by Roger Baldwin, Crystal Eastman and Norman Thomas, and it was 
staffed by an advisory committee of lawyers who volunteered their time 
under the direction of attorney Harry Weinberger. 
Norman Thomas was elected chairman of the AUAM committee to 
deal with the question of conscientious objectors, and as early as April 
campaigned against the proposed federal conscription bill and compul-
sory military training, and appealed for regular civilian trials for objec-
tors. Jane Acldams, Lillian Wald and Norman Thomas met with New-
ton Baker on behalf of the objectors. They requested exemptions not 
just on religious but on ethical grounds, since "it is a matter not of 
corporate but of individual conscience." They noted in their appeal to 
Baker that England's law was "more liberal" than the one before Con-
gress and England had at that time 4000 objectors in prison. The 
AUAM believed that it was better for "some slackers to escape" than 
for America to "coerce men's consciences in a war for freedom."44 
The antimilitarists were convinced that upon the issue of conscription 
rested the future of "the last fortress of democracy in the world," and 
recognized the possibility that on that issue "the greatest adventure in 
human history would go down in failure."45 Consequently, after the 
army bill was passed Thomas wrote to congressional committees de-
manding its repeal. He asked how America could "wage war 'for the 
privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life' while we compel 
the conscientious objector to war . . . ?" "Autocracies may coerce con-
science in this vital matter: democracies do so at their peril."46 
Unlike the AUAM, the Union of Democratic Control had nothing to 
do with the agitation against conscription and the campaign to support 
conscientious objectors. Some members of the UDC realized that to 
ignore this crucial area of repression in wartime was seriously to limit 
the significance of the UDC's protest. F. W. Hirst, the editor of the 
Economist, wrote to Morel that he considered the absence of a conscrip-
tion program a "vital omission." He believed that the first and most 
important thing was to prevent a military despotism from emerging in 
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England, bringing with it the "substitution of martial law for trial by 
judge and jury." Hirst believed that if conscription was adopted self-
government would be destroyed "and with it all possibility of influencing 
the course of events abroad" along the lines the UDC had postulated.47 
As opposed to the AUAM, the civil libertarians in the UDC were a 
minority, and activity in this area was rejected by E. D. Morel for much 
the same reasons that had led Paul Kellogg to abandon the CLB's 
activities. 
On June 9, 1915, a group of UDC members submitted a resolution 
regarding conscription which would have pledged the UDC "to oppose 
to the utmost any attempt to impose compulsory service either for 
military or industrial purposes as being unnecessary for the needs of the 
nation" and not in England's "best interests." Morel wrote to Charles 
Trevelyan that the resolution was "a tremendously grave step to take." 
If it meant anything more than rhetoric, it meant resistance and that, 
concluded Morel, "would clearly bring the UDC within measurable 
distance of prosecution for sedition and rebellion. . . ." In addition, 
Morel made a distinction between compulsion for home defense and 
compulsion for service abroad. He personally would not resist the call 
for home defense, "not having reached the Quaker position. . . ." Morel 
also referred to what he had believed was the agreement of the UDC 
members: that "it was useless activity to oppose measures which would 
be persisted in despite opposition."48 
While the UDC remained England's most significant coalition to end 
the war and promote a democratic peace, its timidity regarding the more 
immediate challenge of universal military conscription left a vacuum 
in the movement which was filled rapidly by the No-Conscription Fel-
lowship. A. Fenner Brockway, editor of the official ILP paper, The 
Labour Leader, published a letter inviting those people not prepared to 
render military service under conscripiton to enroll their names. The 
response to Brockway's letter was so good that on December 3, 1914, the 
formation of the No-Conscription Fellowship was announced, with an 
initial membership of 300 men. Led by Clifford Allen, later Lord Allen 
of Hurtwood, the NCF became "a breathtakingly efficient conspiracy 
against the organized might of the state."49 
Although the work of the No-Conscription Fellowship is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it is important to note that the impetus for this 
organization was the same as that behind the establishment of the UDC 
and the AUAM—the belief that war was inimical to socialism and re-
form. Clifford Allen believed that men and women of commitment had 
"to face the only possible outcome of our Socialist faith," by which he 
meant non-violent resistance to militarism.50 
During his third trial by court martial for refusing to obey military 
orders, Allen explained that he opposed the war because he saw "no 
substantial reason to prevent peace negotiations being entered upon at 
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once. . . . I believe that the Governments of all the nations are too afraid 
of releasing their peoples to make peace. . . ." He added: 
I resist war because I love Liberty. Conscription is the 
denial of liberty. 
If I hold that war and militarism are evils which will only 
cease when men have the courage to stand apart from them, 
I should be false to my own belief if I avoided the dangers 
of military service only to accept some safe civil work as a 
condition of exemption from such service. 
This country is faced with the most insidious danger that 
can confront a free people on the claim of the State to 
dispose of a man's life against his will. . . . 
A war which you can only win by the compulsion of un-
willing men and the persecution of those who are genuine 
will ultimately achieve the ruin of the very ideals for which 
you are fighting.51 
The UDC's unwillingness to campaign for the conscientious objectors 
caused it to lose the direct support of the most prominent peace people in 
England. Bertrand Russell, for example, wrote that he would join the 
No-Conscription Fellowship because the UDC was "too mild and 
troubled with irrelevancies. It will be all right after the war, but not 
now. I wish good people were not so mild. The non-resistance people I 
know here are so Sunclay-schooly—one feels they don't know the volcanic 
side of human nature, they have little humour, no intensity of will, 
nothing of what makes men effective. . . ."52 
Russell's decision to support conscientious objectors led to his im-
prisonment because of a pamphlet he wrote for the No-Conscription 
Fellowship which explained that if people chose to become conscientious 
objectors they would be sentenced to two years at hard labor. Deemed a 
violation of the Defense of the Realm Act, a statute very similar to 
America's Espionage and Sedition Acts, Russell was tried and sentenced 
to sixty-one days imprisonment or a fine of £100, which he refused to 
pay. During his defense, Russell summarized the convictions of the anti-
militarist movement in both England and the United States. He denied 
that he alone was on trial: 
It is the whole tradition of British liberty which our fore-
fathers built up with great trouble and great sacrifice. Other 
nations may excel us in some respects, but the tradition of 
liberty has been the supreme good that we in this country 
have cultivated. We have preserved, more than any other 
Power, respect for the individual conscience. . . . I think 
that under the stress of fear the authorities have somewhat 
forgotten that ancient tradition . . . and the tyranny which 
is resulting will be disastrous if it is not resisted. . . .53 
The failure of the Union of Democratic Control to campaign against 
conscription and to support civil liberties did not prevent its members 
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from becoming victims of the general wartime repression about which 
Russell spoke. Throughout the war the UDC continued to publish 
pamphlets and address large public meetings in order to expose diplo-
matic agreements and later to oppose what they considered an imperialist 
and reactionary treaty. In many cases they were met by riots which, ac-
cording to Trevelyan, "were promoted by officers and recruiting authori-
ties." On occasion meetings were stormed by soldiers who "were invited 
to break the heads of 'pro-Germans' "; these incidents were defended 
by the Government "as spontaneous outbreaks of popular indigna-
tion." Halls were refused by local authorities at the instigation of the 
police, and "every kind of political pressure was exerted to prevent our 
obtaining places to speak in." Newspapers announced that the UDC 
was in the pay of Germany and later in the pay of Bolsheviks; and 
"threats of personal violence were constantly proffered . . . in the reac-
tionary press." Censorship prohibited UDC literature from going to 
neutral countries and from being distributed to the armed services. In 
1917 two of Morel's famous works, Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy and 
Truth and the War, were censored and prohibited from distribution in 
neutral and allied nations. Later, Morel was sentenced to six months in 
prison under the Defense of the Realm Act because he sent a pamphlet, 
Tsardom's Part in the War, not banned from circulation in Britain or 
France to Romain Rolland, the French pacifist. But Rolland happened 
to be in neutral Switzerland at the time. By June 8, 1918, the censor 
refused a permit to export to any foreign destination the monthly UDC, 
or any of the pamphlets published by the Union.54 As Philip Snowden 
noted, it became clear that the government's objective was "to suppress 
every opinion which is disagreeable to them."55 
In addition to official censorship, the London police raided the UDC 
offices and ransacked document files and correspondence. Occasionally, 
the office was broken into secretly at night and papers and correspondence 
were taken.56 
Trevelyan was particularly disturbed that such repression occurred 
under Liberal Party auspices. In a letter to Walter Runciman, the 
director of the Board of Trade, Trevelyan wrote that he had "never for 
a moment doubted that liberty of discussion would be in danger during 
the war. . . . " But he had hoped that the era of repression would be post-
poned as long as the liberals were in office. He had hoped that it would 
"be left to Toryism . . . to adopt a Prussian system." Moreover, Trevelyan 
was troubled that Tory newspapers and speakers could broadcast their 
views, "their creed of vengeance, and their insane policy of dismembering 
Germany" without repression. Only the antimilitarists who tried "to 
make people take saner and more Liberal views" appeared to be 
"silenced by police raids and confiscation of . . . literature."57 
Like the reaction of the AU AM leaders to George Creel and his com-
mittee of former liberals, the UDC members were particularly disap-
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pointed in the attitude of the Liberals in the British government. Trevel-
yan wrote to John Simon, the Secretary of State for Home Affairs, 
reminding him that he had "remained in the Government because he 
had thought that it would be well to have some Liberalism left in high 
places." Trevelyan noted that the seizure of literature would have to 
lead to even greater repression because "police bullying" would not 
silence the dissenters who cherished England's history of liberty.58 
The entire British propaganda department at Crewe House was re-
markably similar to the structure organized by the CPL Crewe House 
under Lord Northcliffe was composed of "evesdroppers, letter-openers, 
deciphers, telephone tappers, spies, an intercept department, a forgery 
department, a criminal investigation department, a propaganda depart-
ment . . . , a censorship department, a ministry of education and a press 
bureau." Like the CPI, Crewe House, staffed by former liberals, was well 
equipped to mobilize patriotism for the war effort.59 
Both the UDC and the AUAM canrpaigned for democratic control of 
foreign policy, the abolition of secret treaties, early peaceful negotia-
tions, a declaration of war aims by belligerent governments and a non-
punitive treaty on the basis of what was to become the Fourteen Points. 
In addition, both the AUAM and the No-Conscription Fellowship gave 
legal counsel to conscientious objectors and worked to protect individual 
conscience and political freedoms even in wartime. Still, after the war 
Bertrand Russell reflected that all he had done "had been totally use-
less" except to himself. He had "not saved a single life or shortened the 
war by a minute." Nor had he "succeeded in doing anything to diminish 
the bitterness which caused the Treaty of Versailles." But at any rate he 
had "not been an accomplice in the crime of all the belligerent nations," 
and for himself he "had acquired a new philosophy and a new youth."60 
Other antimilitarists considered their work a vital challenge to the 
power of the state in wartime. They had refused to recognize "the right 
of the Executive to put the intellect of the citizen in chains" and they 
had refused "to admit as tolerable the conception of a 'State' " which 
could extinguish freedom of thought and expression in time of war. 
They insisted that "the statesmanship which conceals vital facts from 
the nation betrays the nation.. . ."61 
In conclusion, it should be noted that the antimilitarists judged the 
situation accurately. War and democracy cannot both occupy the same 
air space. Bertrand Russell wrote that Jane Addams had "exactly the 
same outlook" as he did. They both recognized that war destroyed 
democracy. The English in the war, Russell noted, became "daily more 
like the Germans. The faults one hates in them are not confined to 
them, but are the products of militarism."62 No individuals were more 
aware of that fact than the antimilitarists. Jane Addams, for example, 
was followed by secret agents and otherwise victimized by those who 
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called her traitor. John Haynes Holmes believed that he would never 
forget "the storm of hatred which broke over her devoted head when 
she denounced the [food] blockade . . . , and declared that the 'United 
States should not allow women and children of any nation to starve.' " 
In 1935, the year of her death, her name was added to a list of dangerous 
Reds, the enemies of America.63 
Governments in wartime seem to fear the sovereignty of the people. 
Contemporary presidents have echoed Wilson's belief that the free ex-
pression of public opinion is dangerous and that to allow dissent "is to 
stab our soldiers in the back." As in World War I, democratic govern-
ments continue to use crude and often brutal methods to control dissent. 
Now, however, they also use a more sophisticated and more deceptive 
rhetoric in an attempt to forestall it altogether. In the United States, for 
example, government spokesmen now concern themselves with "peace 
actions" and troop withdrawal as they déterminately escalate the war. 
But then, the more powerful and total the state becomes, the more ap-
parent freedom it may allow its citizens. Able to transcend the limits of 
public opinion, the government's course need not be altered even with 
the publication of such revelations as were found in The Pentagon 
Papers. The vital force of a democracy can thus be threatened merely by 
the government's willingness to ignore the popular disapproval. As Nor-
man Thomas wrote at the end of World War I, if "war brutalizes the 
individual it cannot ennoble the state."64 
Perhaps it was such a thought which moved President Eisenhower 
forty years later to say during a television interview with Prime Minister 
Macmillan in London that "above all" he would like "to believe that the 
people in the long run are going to do more to promote peace than any 
governments. "Indeed," he added, "I think that people want peace so 
much that one of these days governments had getter get out of their way 
and let them have it."65 The experiences of the antimilitarists of World 
War I and the dissonance of the contemporary peace movement have 
made it clear that governments will not move until large numbers of 
people mobilize to create genuinely public policy. If the history of the 
next fifty years is to be different from the history of the last fifty years, 
the people must recognize that the reformers and dissenters of the peace 
movement cannot themselves make the necessary changes in policy and 
democratic procedure; but that they have set the necessary example. 
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